Does the U.S.–Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Announcement Signal a New Front in Great Power Competition?

On August 4, on the 60th anniversary of the Cook Islands’ becoming a self-governing state, the United States and Cook Islands announced bilateral cooperation to advance deep-sea mining exploration in Cook Islands waters. This comes on the heels of an executive order (EO) titled “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources” that President Trump signed in April this year, paving the way for deep-sea resource exploration and extraction both within U.S. territorial waters and in international waters.

This Critical Questions explores the impetus for these recent U.S. actions, and their implications for both the Pacific and for great power competition. 

Q1: How significant is the Cook Islands’ seabed mineral potential?

A1: The Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority estimates that its waters contain around 6.7 billion metric tons of polymetallic nodules. The Cook Islands’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) covers almost 2 million square kilometers and contains the Penrhyn and Samoa basin plains, where manganese nodules are abundant. These nodules are especially rich in cobalt, nickel, titanium, rare earth elements, and other critical metals like molybdenum, niobium, vanadium, tungsten, and zirconium. The Seabed Minerals Authority has estimated that these nodules could produce 20 million metric tons of cobalt alone.

In 2022, the Authority granted three five-year exploration licenses for polymetallic nodules within the EEZ. Still, it remains uncertain how much of this can ultimately be extracted in a way that is commercially viable, environmentally sustainable, and at scale.

Q2: What is the International Seabed (ISA)’s posture thus far on deep-sea mining, and how has the United States engaged with it?

A2: The April EO signals a clear shift: Washington is now prepared to pursue deep-sea mining outside the International Seabed Authority. Formed in 1994 as an autonomous organization under the United Nations, the ISA was given the authority to regulate the exploration and extraction of mineral resources in seabeds beyond national jurisdiction. All parties to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which the United States is not a signatory, are members of ISA, and therefore subject to ISA rules and regulations—including that exploration and extraction and only be done under a contract with the ISA. While not a signatory to UNCLOS, the United States tends to abide by the intent of UNCLOS, and, until recently, this has extended to deep-sea mining.

While the ISA has approved some exploration contracts in the Pacific, progress on its regulatory framework has been slow, frustrating countries and companies eager to advance critical mineral development. At the same time, deep-sea mining remains highly controversial. Supporters—including Nauru, Cook Islands, Kiribati, and Tonga—push to proceed, while others, such as Fiji, Palau, and Vanuatu, call for a moratorium or outright ban until the environmental impacts on marine ecosystems are better understood.

Until recently, the United States had taken a hands-off approach, deferring to the ISA and avoiding a firm position. While Cook Islands’ seabed minerals lie within its EEZ—and thus outside ISA jurisdiction—the recent U.S.-Cook Islands statement highlights Washington’s intent to seize Pacific mining opportunities. This new posture could create tensions with some Pacific partners while opening new prospects.

Q3: How has China pursued deep-sea mining efforts in the Pacific, and why does China’s use of dual-use deep-sea mining technologies raise security concerns?

A3: China currently holds five ISA contracts to explore for deep-sea minerals in the Pacific and Indian oceans and has been systematically establishing relationships and agreements to pursue these efforts. In the Pacific, these efforts have progressed furthest with the Cook Islands.

China has a growing economic position in the Cook Islands. It is the Cook Islands’ second-largest donor after New Zealand, and since 1997, Beijing has financed a range of infrastructure projects in the Cook Islands. To further advance partnership between the Cook Islands and China, in February 2025, the two countries signed the Action Plan 2025–2030 for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, a 10-year framework that surprised New Zealand and reshaped the regional political dynamic. The plan spans multiple domains, including deep-sea mining, trade and investment, tourism, ocean science, technology and innovation, and deep-sea mining. It specifically notes that the two countries, “will explore areas for further cooperation within the seabed minerals sector noting this is a national priority for the Cook Islands.”

In February 2025, the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority and China’s Ministry of Natural Resources also established a five-year memorandum of understanding (MOU) on enhanced cooperation. The Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority noted that the MOU with the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources “marks a significant step in strengthening bilateral relations between the Cook Islands and China, focusing on the sustainable exploration, management, and utilization of seabed mineral resources.”

China’s pursuit of deep-sea mining in the Pacific has left Western countries concerned about the national security implications of these actions. China has been advancing dual-use technologies—such as autonomous underwater vehicles—that serve both commercial mining and potential military purposes. If Chinese ships and remotely operated vehicles were deployed in the Pacific under the pretext of deep-sea mining, it would be difficult to determine whether their operations were strictly commercial. China’s activities in the Pacific are already disconcerting to long-standing U.S. allies and partners, particularly Australia and New Zealand, and its interest in pursuing deep-sea mining with countries like the Cook Islands, Kiribati, and others presents another avenue for activities that could directly threaten U.S. and allied national security.

Q4: How do recent U.S. announcements alter the landscape of deep-sea mining in the Pacific?

A4: The joint U.S.-Cook Islands statement on Seabed Mineral Resources marks the latest move by the U.S. to position itself at the forefront of deep-sea mining opportunities. The timing of this statement—just months after China signed its own MOU with the Cook Islands that explicitly included deep-sea mining—highlights the geopolitical competition at play. In addition to the Cook Islands, Kiribati—which has an EEZ almost as wide as the continental United States—is exploring a mining partnership with China. This could provide Beijing with opportunities to map and maintain a presence in large swaths of strategic waters across the Pacific.

The United States has struggled to keep pace with growing Chinese influence in the Pacific—a region of growing importance to great power competition. By working with the Cook Islands and establishing a path to deep-sea mining outside of the ISA—of which China, but not the United States, is a member—Washington could strengthen ties with Pacific states eager to advance seabed mining for economic development. Yet openly disregarding the ISA and aggressively pursuing deep-sea mining will also risk further alienating the United States from partners in the Pacific (and beyond) that are adamantly against deep-sea mining or supportive of going through the ISA. Meanwhile, China continues to operate within UNCLOS rules and uses U.S. actions to cast itself as a defender of international law and institutions.

Q5: What are the broader implications of these developments on deep-sea mining and U.S. national interests in the Pacific?

A5: There are several possible follow-on effects from these recent U.S. actions on deep-sea mining. The Metals Company (TMC) has been quick to capitalize on this shift in U.S. policy, submitting applications to the U.S. federal government within days of the EO. However, TMC has come under increasing scrutiny and legal action. Class action lawsuits have been filed against TMC in U.S courts, and in July 2025, the ISA started a formal investigation into TMC for attempting to bypass ISA regulations and UNCLOS. Nonetheless, if the ISA keeps missing deadlines on its regulatory framework, more actors may bypass it, risking the ISA—and parts of UNCLOS—becoming irrelevant.

The implications for U.S. influence in the Pacific are less clear. Until recently, the United States has largely stayed out of the fray, preferring to wait until the ISA completed its review and established clear regulations. The April EO and recent joint statement with the Cook Islands, however, have the United States clearly throwing its lot in with the pro-deep-sea mining team. Although deep-sea mining remains highly contentious in the Pacific, moving past the current stalemate could give the United States new openings in countries where its influence has been limited—such as Kiribati, where it has tried, unsuccessfully, to establish an embassy for almost three years. While this pivot on deep-sea mining could deepen partnerships with some strategically critical partners, it could also put the United States at odds with others, particularly at a time when U.S. commitment to the Pacific is already being questioned.